The coincident rise in crude oil prices and increased numbers of financial participants in the crude oil futures market from 2000-2008 has led to allegations that -speculators‖ drive crude oil prices. As crude oil futures peaked at $147/bbl in July 2008, the role of speculators came under heated debate. In this paper, we employ unique data from the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to test the relation between crude oil prices and the trading positions of various types of traders in the crude oil futures market. We employ Granger Causality tests to analyze lead and lag relations between price and position data at daily and multiple day intervals. We find little evidence that hedge funds and other non-commercial (speculator) position changes Granger-cause price changes;-the results instead suggest that price changes do precede their position changes.
The summer 2008 spike in crude oil prices to $147/bbl jolted the U.S. economy and severely pinched consumers at the gas pump. In reaction to oil prices, U.S. total oil consumption fell by 6.7 percent from 20.8 million barrels per day in 2005 to 19.4 million barrels a day in 2008. Given the predominance of crude oil in the U.S. economy, the price spike also generated substantial attention from regulators, legislators and market critics who decried the existence of excessive speculation in the crude oil futures markets. Indeed, the rise in participation by non-commercial traders during the preceding eight years ) provided great fodder for casual connections with recent price increases. In this paper we apply rigorous econometric techniques to the question as to whether position changes of any particular group of traders was responsible for crude oil futures price changes from 2000-2009. For perspective, we first calculate Working's (1960) speculative index in the crude oil futures market from 2000 through 2008. Working's index is predicated on the fact that long and short hedgers do not always trade simultaneously or in the same quantity, so that speculators fill the role of satisfying unmet hedging demand in the marketplace. We find that the speculation index has also risen steadily from 2001 through mid-2008 (concurrent with the rise in non-commercial participation), but has been relatively stable in the nearby contract since early 2006.
Utilizing more disaggregated data on daily trader positions, we implement Granger causality tests to determine lead and lag relations between price changes and net position changes of various traders in the crude oil futures markets. We execute Granger causality tests in two sub-periods--from July 2000 through June 2004, a period marked by relatively stable participation and prices, and from July 2004 through March 2009, the period marked by extreme price movements and increased participation in the crude oil futures markets. We find that the changing net positions of no specific trader groups lead to price changes in either sub-period or over the entire sample period. We also examine net position changes of various combinations of non-commercial and commercial traders and find similar results. No single group, or combination of groups (even those commonly considered speculators) systematically Granger-cause prices in nearby contracts.
Instead, the causality runs from price changes to position changes, suggesting that various groups of traders are generally trend followers. Commercial traders (in total), manufacturers, commercial dealers, producers, swap dealers and managed money traders (hedge funds) are each shown to be trend followers. Notably, non-commercial traders (in total) and the combined group of swap dealers and non-commercial traders also exhibit trend following behavior over the full sample period as well as sub-periods. These results also hold for daily net position changes in futures alone and in the combined position changes from futures and futures-equivalent options positions. These results are also robust for two-, three-, four-and five day measurement intervals for net position and price changes. Although open interest (including non-commercial participation) is greatest in the nearby contract, we also examine price changes and position changes in the first, second, and third deferred contracts, finding similar results.
Our analysis updates and enhances similar findings in the Interagency Task Force Interim
Report on Crude Oil (ITF (2008) ), which concludes that the sharp increase in crude oil prices through July 2008 can be explained by the fundamentals of the crude oil market. Notably, our update includes an analysis of the significant price collapse (from $147/bbl to below $40/bbl) from July 2008 through March 2009. We show that the price collapse has not been accompanied by a significant drop in the speculation index, casting further doubt on claims that speculator position changes have systematic effects on futures market prices during this period.
Two of the most important functions of futures markets are the transfer of risk and price discovery. In a well-functioning futures market, hedgers interested in reducing their exposure to price risk find counterparties. In a market without speculative interest, long hedgers must find short hedgers with an equal and opposite hedging need. In fact, many traditional hedgers have dual liquidity needs, intending to offset their futures positions before physical delivery of crude oil.
Speculators enhance liquidity and reduce search costs by taking the opposing positions when long hedgers do not perfectly match short hedgers. In this regard, speculators provide immediacy and facilitate the needs of hedgers by mitigating price risk, while adding to overall trading volume, which contributes to more liquid and well-functioning markets.
Of course, excessive speculation has the potential to disrupt markets as well. Shleifer and Summers (1990) note that herding can result from investors reacting to common signals or overreacting to recent news. As de Long et al. (1990) show, rational speculators trading via positive feedback strategies can increase volatility and destabilize prices. Our results, however, complement findings by Boyd et al. (2009) and Brunetti and Buyuksahin (2009) who find that herding among hedge funds is countercyclical and does not destabilize the crude oil futures markets, respectively, during recent years.
In this paper, we identify groups of traders based on self-reported lines of business collected and audited by the CFTC. Commercial traders consist of dealers, producers, manufacturers, and other entities typically involved with crude oil as a commodity. Non-commercial traders include floor brokers and traders and managed money traders (hedge funds). Although non-commercial traders are typically considered speculators, commercial swap dealers who use futures markets to hedge over-the-counter positions are considered speculators by some, since they lack direct exposure to the underlying crude oil commodity. In fact, swap dealers commonly take positions for commodity index funds that view commodities as a distinct asset class, raising concerns that these funds convey the herding mentality from unsophisticated traders into futures markets. Overall, the growth in hedge fund and swap dealer positions in crude oil futures markets ) has led to claims that these traders destabilize markets and drive prices inexplicably high.
Despite these claims, there is surprisingly limited empirical evidence that this trading activity affects prices or volatility. Notably, however, the CFTC's Staff Report on Swap Dealers and Index Traders (CFTC (2008) ) shows that total swap dealer positions declined over the first six months of 2008 while crude oil futures prices rose from $100 to $140.
One limitation of our analysis is that the distinction between hedging and speculation in futures markets is less clear than it may appear. Traditionally, traders with a commercial interest in or an exposure to a physical commodity have been called hedgers, while those without a physical position to offset have been called speculators. In practice, however, commercial traders may -take a view‖ on the price of a commodity or may not hedge in the futures market despite having an exposure to the commodity, positions that could be considered speculative.
Traditional speculators can be differentiated based upon the time horizons at which they operate. Scalpers or market makers, operate at the shortest time horizon -sometimes trading within a single second. These traders typically do not trade with a view as to where prices are going, but rather -make markets‖ by standing ready to buy or sell at a moment's notice. The goal of a market maker is to buy contracts at a slightly lower price than the current market price and sell them at a slightly higher price, perhaps at only a fraction of a cent profit on each contract. Skilled market makers can profit by trading hundreds or even thousands of contracts a day. Market makers provide immediacy to the market. Absent a market maker, a market participant would have to wait until the arrival of a counterparty with an opposite trading interest.
Other types of speculators take longer-term positions based on their view of where prices may be headed. -Day traders‖ establish positions based on their views of where prices might be moving in the next minutes or hours, while -trend followers‖ take positions based on price expectations over a period of days, weeks or months. These speculators can also provide liquidity to hedgers in futures markets. Through their efforts to gather information on underlying commodities, the activity of these traders serves to bring information to the markets and aid in price discovery.
While hedging and speculating are often considered opposing activities and are generally identified with commercial and non-commercial traders, in practice both groups can contribute to price discovery in futures markets. Futures prices reflect the opinions of all traders in the market.
Moreover, the actions of those who can but choose not to enter the futures market can also contribute to price discovery. For example, a commercial trader holding physical inventory, but choosing not to hedge using futures markets (by taking a short position) not only withholds downward pressure on the futures price, but may also signal that prices are expected to rise in the future.
Activities that occur in other markets and other instruments can also impact futures markets.
There are three potential activities that might impact futures trading on U.S. exchanges: (i) the trading of OTC derivatives contracts; (ii) the trading on exempt commercial markets (ECMs); and (iii) the trading on foreign boards of trade. Futures markets comprise only one venue for hedging price risk. In the context of risk management, market participants may be involved concurrently in over-the-counter (OTC) transactions, trades on ECMs, and transactions in foreign markets. Crude oil traders, for example, can hedge cash market positions using a combination of futures, swaps, bilateral forward contracts, and cleared broker and ECM transactions.
The traditional speculative stabilizing theory of Friedman (1953) , that profitable speculation must involve buying when the price is low and selling when the price is high, has come under strong criticism. Some argue that there is a possibility that speculative trading might lead to higher prices if speculators increase their accumulation of inventories (Pirrong (2008) ). However, as suggested by Hamilton (2009b) , crude oil inventories have been significantly lower than historical levels in late 2007 and early 2008 when crude oil price changes were most dramatic.
On the other hand, Davidson (2008) argues that the absence of higher inventories does not necessarily indicate the absence of excess speculation in the market. Using the Marshallian idea the -user cost‖, Davidson argues if oil prices are expected to rise in the future more rapidly than current interest rates, then commercial producers can enhance total profits by leaving more oil underground today for future production.
1 If oil producers do take the user costs of foregone profits into account in their profit maximizing production decisions, then producers may limit current production and above ground inventories may not rise. In this regard, Davidson (2008) points out that traditional hedgers, such as oil producers, might be involved in speculation.
Hamilton (2009a, 2009b) and Kilian (2008) suggest that the cause of the 2007-08 oil price increase is the result of stagnant production and strong demand of crude oil, which lowered the shortrun price elasticity of oil to historically low levels. Hamilton further suggests that both factors--stagnant production and low short-run price elasticity--are needed for speculation to drive prices too high, but that financial speculation (by non-commercial entities) would cause inventories to rise. He concludes that supply and demand fundamentals provide a more plausible explanation for the 2008 price spike.
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Our paper contributes to a rich empirical literature evaluating trader positions and prices in futures markets. Using aggregated public Commitments of Traders (COT) data disseminated by the CFTC, Brorsen and Irwin (1987) and Irwin and Yoshimaru (1999) fail to find a link between hedge fund positions and price volatility and prices, respectively. Brown et al. (2000) 
I. Data and Methodology
We analyze daily position and pricing data for NYMEX light sweet crude oil (West Texas 7 Working's speculative index is calculated as follows:
where SS is short speculator (non-commercial) positions, SL is long speculator positions, HS is short hedge (commercials) positions and HL is long hedge positions (Sanders et al (2008)).
hedging demand by commercials, especially merchant/dealers, in the sample period has increased.
Although potentially alarming, a speculative index of 1.41 is rather comparable to historical index numbers in other markets (see Irwin et al. (2008) ). For example, Peck (1981 Peck ( , 1982 reports the speculative index ranging from 1.15 to 1.68 for agricultural products, depending on time period and commodity. As Working (1960) also notes, the speculative index measures excess speculation in technical terms, not in economic terms. Since the speculative index does not necessarily indicate excessive speculation, we apply additional analyses to speculator positions the crude oil futures market. Whereas the public data only identify -Commercial‖ vs. -Non-commercial‖ categories of crude oil traders, the data provided for this study decompose these two very broad categories into their respective components. In the crude oil futures market, the main commercial sub-categories are -dealer/merchants‖, which includes wholesalers, exporter/importers, and crude oil marketers;
-manufacturers‖, which includes refiners and fabricators; -producers‖; and -commodity swap dealers‖, including all reporting swap dealers as well as arbitrageurs/broker dealers (financial swap dealers and arbitrageurs/broker dealer sub-categories were merged with commodity swap dealers partway through our sample data). 11 It is clear that many of the large CTAs, CPOs, and associated persons are considered to be hedge funds and hedge fund operators. Accordingly, we conform to the academic literature and to common financial parlance by referring to the three types of institutions collectively as hedge funds. In addition, for the purposes of this paper, market surveillance staff at the CFTC identified other participants who were not registered in any of these three categories but were known to be 9 See Figure 3a .
10 Despite these clear distinctions in groups that comprise hedge funds, a point of terminology is in order. Although hedge fund activity has been a subject of intense scrutiny in recent years by academic researchers, market participants, policy makers and the media, there is no broadly accepted definition of a hedge fund. Nor are hedge funds defined in the statutes governing futures trading. 11 A commodity pool is defined as an investment trust, syndicate or a similar form of enterprise engaged in trading pooled funds in futures and options on futures contracts. A commodity pool is similar to a mutual fund company, except that it invests pooled money in the futures and options markets. Like securities counterparts, a commodity pool operator (CPO) might invest in financial markets or commodity markets. Unlike mutual funds, however, commodity pools may be either long or short derivative contracts. A CPO's principle objective is to provide smaller investors the opportunity to invest in futures and options markets with greater diversification with professional trade management. The CPO solicits funds from others for investing in futures and options on futures. The commoditytrading advisor (CTA) manages the accounts and is the equivalent of an advisor in the securities world.
managing money -and so we also included these in the hedge fund category (see bottom of Table 2 ). For each group of traders, we use two measures of the group's daily positions to assess changes in the market. We use the net position of each group's daily net position in futures-only and futures plus adjusted options, which may be net short (-) or long (+). Over time, the net positions of different trader categories display dynamic change. From Table 3a and 3b, we see that the net positions (long -short) of commercial and non-commercial traders fluctuate from year to year in nearby contracts. 12 In general, however, we observe that commodity swap dealers have net futures positions which have steadily increased during the sample period. Non-registered participants also take net long positions over time. These two groups of traders on average take positions in the opposite-direction of the other traders. Contrary to common belief, hedge funds as a group were net short in the nearby contract during the recent run-up of crude oil prices.. In addition, we observe that most trader subcategories' net position in terms of magnitude in the nearby contracts has increased during the sample period, most notably that of commodity swap dealers, which has more than doubled in the nearby futures and more than tripled in all maturities since 2004.
Looking at the time series properties of the price and net positions data, we find that the price variable is non-stationary while net positions of different trader categories in nearby contracts are stationary in both level and first differences (See Table 4 ). In addition to our different trader types, we also construct three aggregate net position variables: Net position of all commercials (COM), non-commercials (NON) and non-commercial plus commodity swap dealers (ANC). Since commodity swap dealers also include commodity index traders, these are also analyzed as part of non-commercial traders. Although CFTC (2008) calculations suggest that in crude oil market not more than 50 percent of swap dealer can be considered as commodity index trader, we will assume that all the swap dealer activities are linked to commodity index trading. Since both net position levels and changes are stationary, we provide our analysis along both dimensions for different trader types.
Our preliminary analysis of the relation between price changes and net positions taken by the different trader types in nearby contracts starts by considering the correlation coefficients. Table 5a and 5b A formal way to statistically test for whether one variable leads another are generally known as Granger causality tests. However, Granger causality tests do not prove a causal relation between variables, only a statistical probability of one variable leading another. Nonetheless, Granger causality provides useful information as to whether a trader activity prompts, in a forecasting sense, price movements and/or vice versa. In the next subsection, we provide brief description of implementation of Granger causality test in our paper.
Testing Causality
The Granger causality test is based on a bivariate VAR representation of two weakly stationary and ergodic time series {X t } and {Y t }: Since the test results are sensitive to the lag selection, it is important to choose the appropriate lag length to ensure that the residuals have no serial correlation, no conditional heteroskedasticity and do not deviate too much from Gaussian white noise. To find the optimal lag used in the estimation, we employ the Schwarz criterion, which suggests one lag in each case.
II. Estimation Results
The Table 6 , there are unidirectional causalities from price changes to net position changes as well as to the net positions of most trader types.
Results from the nearby contract show no unidirectional or bi-directional causality running from positions or position changes to price changes for any trader type, or any measurement interval (from one to five days).
Specifically, Granger causality results in Table 6a suggest that we reject the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality from price changes to net position changes and price changes to net positions for aggregate trader groups as well. However, the reverse non-causality test cannot be rejected. This result holds for futures as well as futures plus futures-equivalent options contracts.
Except for the positions of non-commercial traders combined with swap dealers, we observe that unidirectional causality from price changes to position is weakening as we increase the number of days in the measurement interval.
A similar pattern of causality is observed for individual trader group in the nearby futures contracts. The non-causality from price changes to net positions and price changes to positions is rejected at least in the daily price change for futures-only and futures plus delta adjusted options position for the biggest two categories of non-commercials: managed money traders (hedge funds) and floor brokers and traders. However, we fail to reject non-causality from position change to price changes for these groups at 5 percent level of significance in both futures and futures plus options contracts. There is a very weak evidence of causality from the level of net futures plus options positions of floor brokers and traders to in price changes at the 5 percent level of significance, but the rejection of non-causality only holds at the margin, that is to say when we increase the significance level to 1 percent, we fail to reject the null of non-causality (See Table 6b ). In summary, we observe uni-directional causality from the level and net position changes of some types of traders to change price. However, the reverse causality is rejected for all different types of traders. 13 This result holds for non-commercial traders in total, for managed money traders and swap dealers individually, and for the positions of non-commercial traders combined with swap dealers. Notably, we find no statistical evidence over the past eight and a half years that position changes by any group of traders systematically precedes price changes. This result holds both for all net position changes of all net commercial participants and for net positions held by traders in commercial sub-categories: commercial manufacturers, commercial dealers, commercial producers, and other commercial entities.
In fact, many trader groups are shown to be trend followers over the full sample period, including commercial traders in total and manufacturers, commercial dealers, producers, swap dealers and managed money traders individually. Notably, swap dealers and managed money traders as well as the positions of non-commercial traders combined with swap dealers also exhibit trend following behavior over the full sample period.
In the second part of the study, we divided our sample into two sub-periods. The first sub- Tables 8a, 8b and 8c provide our causality results for the second sub-period. There is strong evidence of uni-directional causality from price change to net position changes of different trader types. However, we again fail to observe bidirectional causality between price change and net position change of different trader groups. Specifically, the net position changes of non-commercials, commercials as well as non-commercials combined with swap dealers is preceded by price change.
Although we observe some weak evidence of causality from the level of net positions of noncommercials combined with swap dealers, we fail to see this causality in the individual groups of this aggregate group.
III. Conclusions
The increased participation of traditional speculators as well as commodity index traders in crude oil futures market raise the question of whether these traders have an impact on market prices. The recent increase and eventually fast decline in crude oil prices has been linked to speculators. Based on our linear Granger causality tests, we fail to find the causality from these traders position to prices. Our results suggest that price changes leads the net position and net position changes of speculators and commodity swap dealers, with little or no feedback in the reverse direction. This unidirectional causality suggests that traditional speculators as well as commodity swap dealers are generally trend followers. However, Granger-causality results should not be interpreted as -cause‖
and -effect‖ relation but should be interpreted as lead and lag relation between variables. Therefore, our results should not also be interpreted as price changes causing position changes. It might be possible that both variables could be reacting to the same common factors. Table 1a 
where SS is short speculator (non-commercial) positions, SL is long speculator positions, HS is short hedge (commercials) positions and HL is long hedge positions (Sanders et al (2008)). Table 4 presents the unit root tests on the price and net positions for the eight types of large traders between 2000 and 2009 in the WTI futures and futures plus futures equivalent options, respectively. The critical value for ADF test statistics are -3.43, -2.86 and -2.56 for 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance. If the calculated value is lower than critical value, then the series is said to be stationary at the relevant level of significance. Table 5d presents the correlation between price and net position changes for the eight types of large traders between 2000 and 2009 in the WTI nearby futures plus futures equivalent options. 
